

## CHARLIE SHORTHAIK

As I lay dying in a creaking bed  
 Staring at the ceiling above my head;  
 In the peeling paint I can picture the sky  
 Seen by my ancestors in days gone by.  
 And the glaring, ugly, naked light  
 Becomes a campfire warm in the night--  
 Where death lurks silent beyond the glare  
 Patiently stalking old Charlie Shorthair.  
 Drawing a blanket around my shoulders  
 I moan through the night as the fire smoulders,  
 Recalling battles, proud, fierce and bold,  
 That took place only in a mind grown old.  
 No, there is no honor in death for me,  
 For to perish in battle was not to be;  
 My death ends not a glorious life  
 Portrayed in legend of bow and knife.  
 I am lying dressed in a filthy room  
 On West 34th Street awaiting my doom;  
 Leaving behind neither wealth nor fame,  
 Not even fine children bearing my name.  
 This lonely Indian in a tenement lies  
 With nothing to comfort him as he dies  
 Except the legend of a glorious past  
 That now--in death--may be his at last.

BY TED PAULS

Kipple is published and edited by Ted Pauls, 1448 Meridene Drive, Baltimore, Maryland, 21212. Copies of this irregular but frequent journal of opinion and commentary are available in exchange for letters of comment, contributions, similar periodicals, or the cash sum of 20¢ per issue. The number in the address box is the number of the last issue you will receive; the letter "T" indicates that we exchange publications; and the letter "S" means this is a sample copy.

HAROLD WILSON'S DILEMMA: The precipitous and very probably suicidal decision of Ian Smith's white minority government to declare Rhodesia independent of Great Britain has had reverberations in every important capital on the globe and has raised the horrifying prospect of full-scale racial warfare in Central Africa. Premier Smith's ludicrous attempts to draw a parallel between Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence and the only previous declaration of its type in British colonial history (viz., the one promulgated in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in July of 1776) would be laughable if the situation were not so grimly serious. The issue in Rhodesia is not and never has been independence, for the territory has been self-governing for a number of years; what is at issue in this confrontation between the rebel Salisbury government and the civilized world is majority rule, which in Rhodesia means black rule and which the Smith regime is pledged to prevent. There is little question of what will be the eventual outcome of this confrontation: the rebellious white Rhodesians will be defeated, by one means or another, and the black majority will achieve the political dominance which mathematics, history and geography combine to make inevitable--provided that the nation is not destroyed in the process. This latter prospect does not appear to bother the Smith regime to any great

## JOTTINGS FROM THE

extent; Premier Smith and the whites who ardently support him appear to be imbued with the determination to go under "heroically", with guns blazing, taking as much of Central Africa with them as possible.

The effect of the sordid events taking place in Salisbury on the policies of various other nations is fascinating. Virtually every country in the world agrees that the rebellion must be brought to a swift conclusion and minority rule in Rhodesia terminated. Beyond this point, however, disagreement and disunity are total. Great Britain insists that the responsibility for disciplining the rebellious whites is hers alone, and is determined to accomplish what the more militant envision as the limited goal of restoring constitutional government through legal maneuvers and economic sanctions. The United States supports this policy--largely, I feel, out of an unwillingness to take the initiative in propounding a more decisive policy--but Washington has tended to be somewhat more militant than London in its official statements on the rebellion.

The Afro-Asian "third force" is virtually unanimous in demanding immediate and overwhelming military action against the Salisbury government, and while several of these nations have offered to



provide detachments of troops for the purpose, their primary effort, to date, has been toward procuring the intervention of some larger power. These countries are, in general, willing to cooperate with Great Britain in the economic and diplomatic measures it has proposed (even when, as in the case of Zambia, they are to one degree or another economically dependent upon Rhodesia), but they view these sanctions as insufficient to resolve the situation promptly. The position of independent Zambia, Rhodesia's northern neighbor, is especially acute. Its economy is totally dependent upon Rhodesian railroad facilities and the power generated by the Kariba dam, situated on the Zambia-Rhodesia border, and its military strength is inadequate to cope with any Rhodesian gambit such as shutting down the dam. Yet Zambia is a leading spokesman for the Afro-Asian militants: Great Britain has offered to dispatch troops to the capital, Lusaka, as a deterrent against Rhodesian action, but the government of Zambia insists that British troops seize the Kariba dam in order to protect this power supply. This Great Britain refuses to do, because such an action would almost inevitably result in fighting between British and Rhodesian armed forces. Zambia's moderate president, Kenneth Kaunda, has announced that he will continue to seek British troops for this purpose; if Great Britain continues to refuse, he will request ground troops from the United States; and if the United States refuses, he will seek the assistance of Soviet forces. The advent of Soviet military forces into Zambia is not a very realistic possibility, but the mere fact that it is casually suggested in this manner is an indication of the depth of feeling against the Salisbury insurgents.

As for the Communist countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, they are vehemently supporting the demand for military action against the Smith government, preferably by Great Britain but if neces-

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sary by a United Nations force (to which the Soviet Union has offered to contribute troops). In Central Africa, unlike on the Indo-Pakistan frontier, Moscow has concluded that its interests are not necessarily served by a peaceful settlement. Apart from the obvious desire of the Communists to strengthen their "fraternal ties" with the emerging nations of Africa, the Soviet Union's support of military intervention is necessitated by the requirements of the ubiquitous conflict with Peking: if the Soviets are not sufficiently militant in opposing Smith's reactionary clique, Communist China will be provided with additional ammunition to support its charges of "softness on imperialism", racialism and lack of revolutionary fervor.

Through all of this controversy, Prime Minister Harold Wilson is the unfortunate and abject "man in the middle" upon whom criticism and opprobrium from all directions naturally falls. The Labour Government, in attempting to steer a reasonable and moderate course through troubled waters, is on the horns of a political dilemma of impressive proportions. London's refusal to institute military action against the rebel regime is gaining Britain the increasing hostility of many African and Asian countries, including some Commonwealth members. It is also setting the stage for precisely the sort of prolonged racial violence which both Britain and the United States are so anxious to avoid. The failure of Great Britain to initiate the sort of action which would bring this rebellion to a prompt conclusion renders it likely that eventually some sort of African army will invade Rhodesia. But while London has the capacity to intervene so massively that resistance would be smothered before it really got underway, thereby minimizing the danger of communal



violence in Rhodesia and neighboring South Africa, any African force assembled to conduct an invasion would probably be sufficiently small and inefficient to permit Rhodesia's well-trained and extremely tough army to offer a prolonged and bloody resistance--thereby making violence among civilian elements far more likely and far more widespread.

It is virtually certain, however, that military intervention in Rhodesia (except in the event of some extraordinary provocation) would be political suicide for Harold Wilson. Current polls indicate that the British electorate supports the present policy of economic and diplomatic sanctions aimed at restoring constitutional authority in Salisbury, primarily, I suppose, out of the traditional British respect for due process and law and order. But the polls also indicate that the sending of British troops into Rhodesia, and the shedding of white Rhodesian blood by British soldiers, would be extremely unpopular. Mr. Wilson's incredibly thin parliamentary majority would not survive a vote of "no confidence" on the Rhodesia issue if British soldiers were actually engaged in a shooting war there, and the Labour Party, from all indications, would go down to defeat in the resultant elections.

This, then, is Harold Wilson's dilemma: the fate of Central Africa may very well depend upon prompt British military action against the Salisbury insurgents, but the fate of Harold Wilson's government depends upon a continued refusal to authorize such action. The present policy is designed to accomplish two conflicting purposes--viz., to meet Great Britain's moral obligation to her black subjects in Rhodesia while simultaneously preserving the Labour Government's domestic position--and therefore will probably fail to accomplish either. It is in the nature of the situation that Prime Minister Wilson will shortly be compelled to choose between them. If British forces were to intervene vigorously and in sufficient strength, all of Rhodesia's population centers and significant industrial facilities could be in British hands in a matter of days. By the time new elections could be held, the suppression of the rebellion would be a fait accompli, which the Conservative Government which came to power in those elections could not reverse (even if it wished to). But it requires rare political courage and vision to sacrifice popularity in order to do what is right, especially in foreign affairs, and Harold Wilson has never impressed me as the sort of political leader capable of such a decision.

**TOWARD RACIAL INTEGRATION:** The year 1965, to which we have recently bid adieu, will be remembered as another year of substantial progress in the civil rights movement. It was marked by the passage in Washington of voting rights legislation and the conviction by southern white juries of several segregationists who engaged in violence in attempts to preserve racial injustice, as well as, less dramatically but more significantly, the smooth and peaceful compliance of hundreds of southern communities with the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Despite the continued existence of pockets of massive resistance, I believe that it is reasonable to assert that the struggle for legal equality, racial justice, equal opportunity or whatever other label one chooses to employ, has largely accomplished its objectives in the South. Even in the North, where the injustice is perpetrated by unwritten consensus rather than by statute and there exist fewer clear targets for protest, there is at least a little light showing at the end of the tunnel. Most of us can confidently expect to see the complete abolition of racial discrimination within our lifetimes. Once this objective is accomplished, it will be possible to devote primary attention to the ultimate goal: the achievement of racial integration.

"Integration" is one of the most carelessly used words in the modern English vocabulary, and there is a persistent tendency, even on the



part of participants in the civil rights movement, to confuse the concept with other, more limited terms such as "equal opportunity", "racial justice", and so on. These terms refer to the absolutely necessary, highly desirable but nevertheless comparatively limited elimination of racial discrimination. It is, however, entirely possible to fully achieve this objective without racial integration. The effect of racial discrimination is to penalize individuals on account of their ethnic background. This insult to human intelligence may be largely eradicated by the passage of laws abolishing segregation in such areas as schooling, housing, employment and so forth, but this leaves virtually untouched the essence of segregation. The barriers are primarily psychological rather than material or legal. One may witness today in one of the southern cities congratulated for its ready compliance with the law Negroes and whites intermixed on the streets, in the restaurants, in the schools and on the busses, but psychologically the segregation is still total, and both the Negroes and the whites realize it. I recall once reading about a zoological experiment in which a large aquarium was divided into several compartments by sheets of glass, and minnows and carnivorous fishes which feed on them were placed in adjoining compartments. Every time a minnow would swim close to the partition, the predator on the opposite side of the invisible pane would instinctively make a lunge for it, bashing its head against the divider. After some days of these futile efforts to capture their natural quarry, the predators began to ignore the minnows altogether. Then the glass partitions were removed, and predator and prey began to freely intermingle; but the carnivorous fish did not attack the minnows and the minnows did not flee in panic from the predators, because the invisible barrier which separated them continued to function--psychologically. Similarly, those communities in the South which have fully complied with the provisions of the Federal anti-discrimination statutes have the appearance of being "integrated", but the reality is something quite different; for while the law has removed the obvious physical barriers, the psychological barrier remains, beyond the power of the law to eliminate. The segregation caused by the attitude of individual human beings will endure long after its outward manifestations have been abolished.

One should not, of course, underestimate the importance of what has been accomplished. In the immediately foreseeable future, this nation will have totally repudiated the concept of depriving an individual of political rights and/or social privileges because of his racial origin. However, when this happy situation at last becomes a reality, it will constitute only the first halting step in the long journey toward integration, which has essentially nothing to do with civil rights or "racial justice" or equality-before-the-law. Racial integration does not mean the existence of legislation permitting Negroes to eat in restaurants or ride in the front of busses, because it is only when such laws are unnecessary and superfluous that genuine integration can be said to exist. Nor does integration fundamentally have very much to do with the principal bugaboo of white supremacists, inter-racial marriage, for integration will truly exist only when the term "inter-racial marriage" no longer possesses any relevance. "Integration" will take place when Negroes are no longer thought of as Negroes by whites (and vice versa), i.e., more broadly, when the people of this country cease thinking of each other in terms of race. The phrase "a victory for integration" calls to mind massive developments such as the famous Supreme Court ruling in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education or the passage of voting rights legislation, but these landmark events are concerned with justice, not integration. The most important victory for integration in recent years was overlooked by virtually everyone; it is unimpressive, insignificant--and profoundly meaningful. There is a recently



released motion picture called "The Bedford Incident", and one of the performers involved in this otherwise unexceptional spy drama is Sidney Poitier. The role he plays does not call for a Negro actor, and there is absolutely no mention of his race in the script. The role requires a male actor, nothing more. That is a victory for integration.

It is ironic that the favorite cliché employed by racists to justify their opposition to civil rights legislation--viz., that "Integration is a matter for individuals; it can't be legislated"--is perfectly true, after all. Of course, when the people who generally employ this argument make such a statement, they aren't referring to integration at all, but to equal rights, which can and must be legislated. The statement is nevertheless true: integration, properly defined, cannot be achieved by legislation. Laws are capable of guaranteeing rights and of establishing the atmosphere in which people of different races, brought into everyday contact, can learn to know each other, but legislation can only indirectly foster integration. Stringent civil rights laws will insure racial justice in education, housing, public accommodations, and so forth, thereby eliminating most of the affronts to human dignity which Negroes have been compelled to endure, but the prejudice which constitutes the essence of segregation (of which the separation of facilities is merely the superficial manifestation) cannot be eliminated by legislation. Only education and experience will suffice to stop people from thinking in terms of racial categories and stereotypes, and it is decidedly unlikely that any person alive today will ever see genuine integration in the United States.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY under the guidance of Lyndon B. Johnson is afflicted with a crippling tendency to concentrate on the day-to-day preservation of the status quo without sufficient consideration of long-term consequences. The far-sighted policies of the abbreviated Kennedy Administration, which had caused President Kennedy to be looked upon as a popular hero throughout the underdeveloped world and especially in Latin America, have been one by one diluted, reversed, betrayed. In the more than two years since his fateful accession to the presidency, Lyndon Johnson's foreign policy initiatives have with a solitary exception (viz., the peaceful settlement of the canal dispute with the Republic of Panama) failed to achieve any worthwhile or lasting purpose. Examine a few specific examples: Mr. Johnson inherited a guerilla war in South Vietnam in which 16,000 American troops were involved, nominally in the capacity of "advisors" to the South Vietnamese armed forces; he has expanded the scope of the conflict by the continuous bombing of North Vietnam and increased the number of US soldiers participating in the fighting to 180,000+, thereby creating an atmosphere in which United States withdrawal would be infinitely more difficult and (in terms of prestige) costly than it would have been two years ago. Mr. Johnson inherited a Latin policy which called for fundamental social revolutions in backward countries dominated by ruthless oligarchies; he has substituted the reactionary Johnson Doctrine, according to which Washington exercises an absolute veto over what form of government the citizens of the ostensibly "sovereign" nations of Latin America shall be permitted. He inherited a Grand Alliance in the process of dissolving, and has taken no concrete action whatever in Europe--except to terrify the Russians by moving closer to placing nuclear weapons in the hands of Germans. He has managed to offend both sides in a border war between India and Pakistan, which is a neat trick even for a Texan, and in an act of spectacular pettiness, the Johnson Administration refused Ghana's request for surplus food because that country's chief of state had recently published a book critical of the United States. These are merely the high points of an incredible succes-



sion of dismal failure, unimaginative blunders and egregious stupidities which constitutes the Johnson contribution during the preceding two years to the modern history of United States foreign policy.

Nearly as appalling as these foreign policy decisions themselves is the secrecy, deviousness and outright duplicity which characterizes the Administration's relationship with the public with regard to its own foreign policy. Here, again, the examples are too numerous to mention except to provide a representative sampling. Reports in the Communist press that the United States was bombing infiltration routes in Laos, at that time a serious alteration of policy (and how far we've come since...!), were at first vehemently denied by the Administration, then quietly confirmed a few weeks later. The entire dreary Dominican episode was characterized by an astounding lack of candor. I think it is fair to say that at no time during the fighting in Santo Domingo were the American people given by their elected leaders an honest account of what was transpiring; it was only by the accounts of a few courageous television news reporters that the citizenry was able to discover that United States troops were assisting the forces of a military junta to kill men (and women) loyal to the only elected government in the modern history of the Dominican Republic. And, of course, the Administration consistently asserted that the Communists had shown no desire to negotiate in Vietnam, only to have Eric Sevareid compel the admission that, well, yes, Hanoi had offered to discuss the matter in Rangoon, but this wasn't a serious offer. (In view of Hanoi's consistently reiterated demand that the United States withdraw all of its forces before any negotiations get under way, it is easy to understand why the offer would have been considered unpromising. But there is absolutely no excuse for the fact that the American people were not informed about it until a reporter published the story over a year later.)

What is truly ironic about this situation is that President Johnson's domestic policies are so liberal as to be revolutionary. How can a man who is astute and perceptive enough to propose the noteworthy social legislation of the past two years simultaneously promote such a narrow and short-sighted foreign policy? Part of the explanation for this paradox lies, I believe, in the likelihood that the Johnson foreign policy is not so much a deliberate and considered response to the changing world as a sort of blind, thrashing reaction. According to this theory, the trouble is not that Lyndon Johnson is a proponent of Nineteenth Century reactionary ("imperialist") diplomacy, but rather that he is so completely out of his element in foreign policy matters that he carries out policies without the slightest awareness of their ultimate consequences. The combination of great power and great ignorance is the deadliest known. It is plain enough that President Johnson is not particularly interested in foreign affairs; he would far rather concentrate on the Great Society. I believe it is a reasonable assumption that his lack of interest is precisely matched by a lack of knowledge. Having no genuine comprehension of the forces at work in the world today, he tends to rely on the advice of long-time assistants. The source of the present difficulty, therefore, is the fact that the advice Mr. Johnson receives is faulty. Given a President with little interest in or knowledge of world matters, and a group of advisers typified by Thomas C. Mann, a narrow-minded, patronizing admirer of the Latin American military, it is not really difficult to understand how US foreign policy could have slipped so badly from the refreshing and imaginative pinnacle of the Kennedy years.

The depressing aspect of this situation is that there is little that can be done about it. Criticism has no effect other than annoying the President; protest demonstrations, as the New Left is in the process of discovering, are not effective with respect to foreign policy



issues as they are in regard to segregated lunch counters or discriminatory voter registration procedures. Thirty thousand peace marchers in Washington cannot alter a foreign policy; even thirty million dissenting opinions in a Gallup Poll might not succeed in forcing the Administration to reverse its policies abroad. Apart from the tradition of politics (and hence dissent) stopping at the water's edge, another reason for this lies in the nature of the Johnson victory in 1964. The President has skillfully monopolized the broad center with his consensus theory of government, thereby causing all those who disagree with his policies, whether they are on the Left or the Right, to be popularly looked upon as extremists. Since, barring a failure of his health or some earth-shaking political catastrophe, Lyndon Johnson is already as much as elected to a second term, there is little prospect for improvement until 1972--when, if fortune is with us, a Democrat whose foreign policy is as liberal as his domestic policy should assume the duties of the presidency. Unfortunately, after six more years of supporting military juntas in Latin America, defending indefensible governments in Asia and cutting off food shipments to countries whose leaders write nasty books, the situation may have deteriorated beyond redemption.

SHORT NOTES ON LONG SUBJECTS: The educational value of commercial television is frequently questioned, denied and often ridiculed by a veritable legion of detractors, including sincere critics of the medium as well as self-styled vanguards of the intelligentsia who assert the incorrigible mediocrity of television fare largely because it is fashionable to do so. Without for a moment denying that the medium offers a great deal of third-rate programming--including local "home" shows apparently designed with a viewing audience of congenital morons in mind and several "hillbilly" comedies which are so wholesome as to be utterly tiresome--one should not lose sight of the increasingly large number of "specials" being presented. During the week preceding Christmas, for example, the networks offered some fascinating and instructive programs. Apart from the Christmas-oriented specials and year-end news summaries, which of course made the week atypical, there were: an NBC documentary entitled "Vietnam: December, 1965", covering military, political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict; a splendid debate about US policy in Vietnam between students at Harvard and Oxford, linked via the Early Bird communications satellite; a superb CBS documentary concerning Jane Goodall's five year study of chimpanzees in their natural habitat; and NBC's hour program on Michelangelo, "The Last Giant". +++ There are valid moral objections to military conscription even when it is administered in a just and even-handed fashion, but recent instances in which local Selective Service offices have utilized the draft as an instrument of reprisal against political dissidents are nothing less than horrifying. Student peace demonstrators in Michigan were reclassified 1-A after participating in sit-ins at their local draft boards. The protestors had been arrested in accordance with civil law, convicted of trespassing and fined; the additional hardship of declaring them "draft delinquents" represents a gross and appalling misuse of authority. Fortunately, these reclassifications are so blatantly unconstitutional that it is unthinkable that the practice will survive a court test. +++ The following limerick was composed during a rare flash of inspiration shortly after the conclusion of the 1964 Presidential contest, but for some unknown reason I never got around to publishing it: "There was a young man named Barry/Whom a girl named Peg did marry/Said he I'll be President/In the White House a resident/But, alas! just six states did he carry."

--Ted Pauls



# ESSAYS IN CONSERVATISM

BY PUBLICOLA

INSTALLMENT EIGHT

In the year 1906 there appeared in France a short treatise curiously entitled "Réflexions sur la Violence". Its author, a man whom many have viewed in one way or another as the spiritual father of fascism, was in fact a socialist, although admittedly of a peculiar sort. Georges Sorel was the philosophical spokesman of anarcho-syndicalism. As such, he harbored a venomous hatred for rationalism, for intellectualism, for the social sciences--the "little sciences" as he called them--and particularly for the elaborate but mundane political programs prepared by the parties of the Second (or Socialist) International.

In contradistinction to these lengthy treatises, which were the work of theorists and intellectuals, Sorel developed the theory of a single catastrophic political myth. Contemptuous of democracy and of liberalism in general, with its bourgeois predilections in the direction of the "practical" and the "possible", with its limited vision and its failure to appreciate the unconscious factors in the determination of human behavior, Sorel enthusiastically stated the case for an apocalyptic revolution. This would be a revolution in which the "decadent" forces of bourgeois society would finally be confronted directly by the camp of the proletariat in a violent dénouement which would destroy the established order in its entirety.

To arouse the revolutionary élan of the workers, however, Sorel would have socialists rely not upon rationalistic theorizing or absurd political models--by themselves, he argued, these could do nothing but bore people--but instead they should base their slogans on the "myth" of the general strike. What is a myth? For Sorel it is simply the exact opposite of a scientific hypothesis and "practical" political program. If men are to become revolutionaries, he declared, it is not enough that they should orient their action solely in the soil of day-to-day gains and slogans; instead they should be taught to picture their coming action as an ultimate battle in which their cause is destined to triumph. Through the preparation of a mythical motivation to action, which he described as "the convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions in the language of movement," the revolutionaries would raise their following to a level of romantic heroism which would ultimately lead to societal catharsis. "The myths are not a description of things, but expressions of a determination to act."

The great operational strength of a mythical motivation Sorel analyzed as follows: "People who are living in this world of 'myths', are secure from all refutation. (...) No failure proves anything against Socialism since the latter has become a work of preparation (for revolution); if they are checked, it merely proves that the apprenticeship has been insufficient; they must set to work again with more courage, persistence and confidence than before..."

It is senseless, he declared, to inquire into the practicality of a myth, for it is nothing more than a means to act upon the present. Its great power; however, resides in the fact that it consists of "...a body of images, which, by intuition alone, and before any considered analyses are made, is capable of evoking as an undivided whole the mass of sentiments which corresponds to the different manifestations of the



war undertaken by Socialism against modern society." Ideally, one need but utter the magic words, and like Pavlov's dog, the workers would salivate.

All of this has a definite bearing on the International Teach-In which recently took place in Toronto. If the Teach-In accomplished nothing else, it did, to its credit, make clear beyond dispute the unmistakable propensity of convinced ideologues to salivate upon hearing the appropriate cue. Those who attended the event were witnesses time and monotonous time again to the utterly depressing spectacle of conditioned human responses. "By intuition alone, and before any considered analyses" could be made, the convinced partisans rallied to the support of each successive dragon-slayer--I refrain at this point from generalizing and using the term "demagogue"--who with the appropriate political god-and-devil-terms, rhetorically "slew" his opponents. If the major part of the audience attended the great event in expectation of a dispassionate attempt to reconcile divergent opinions, and to seek to discover some common ground, however insignificant on the surface, in the interest of solving international conflict, then the majority were disappointed. For what they were given was not debate, but the practical content of myth; that is to say, ritual. With this limitation, of course, the show was admittedly entertaining. But so is burlesque. One major difference between the two did however emerge. For while the majority of speakers at the Teach-In seemed to say with Rousseau, "let us begin by setting aside the facts, for they do not affect the matter," at least in burlesque, the facts are invariably--and with little ado--brought before the scrutiny of the audience. Here at least it is recognized that the facts really do affect the matter. Indeed, without the facts there is no matter at all!

As a first observation, therefore, in the event that Toronto should some day host another Teach-In, I should like to propose that before each session the speakers be taken for an invigorating stroll down Spadina to the corner of Dundas. Here "by intuition alone", in Sorel's words, such eminent guests as Messrs. Worthy and Jagan in particular, not to mention several others, might pick up a few helpful pointers as to the proper manner in which to carry on a debate. Incidentally, for the same reason it might be advisable to take along any professional SDS, i.e., "Students for a Democratic Society", who happen to be on hand.

The essential truth about the Teach-In, although many people loathe to face it, is that by any honest standards whatever it was a practically unmitigated failure. The key debate of the session, that dealing with the Vietnam problem, made this desperately obvious.

Although Mr. Nguyen Phu Duc, a master of law from Harvard, presented an admirable account of the Hanoi-oriented insurrection taking place within South Vietnam, carefully compiling statistic upon statistic in an effort to detail the coordinated campaign of terrorism and banditry being conducted against his government, as we have already mentioned a large percentage of the audience, being previously committed, was simply disinterested in statistics and facts. The greatest surprise of this speech, in fact, was that the speaker was not rudely insulted and booed by the 300-500 SDS visitors who arrived at Varsity Arena on Saturday morning.

Following Mr. Nguyen Phu Duc was Phuong Margain, the Cambodian representative, who immediately changed the tone of the session from one of high drama to low farce. "The only intervention" in South Vietnam, he declared, "has been American intervention". North Vietnam, in his view and in that of his exalted Prince Sihanouk, has provided only "moral support". American intervention, he argued, has consequently given the "international conscience"--I have yet to understand what this might be--cause to feel "infinite sadness". How then is the war to be ended?



Quite simply, said the emissary of the Asian "Emperor" who so recently put on his "new clothes"; the "American Imperialists" must deal directly with the NFL as the "only representative of the South Vietnamese people", and must dispose of the Saigon government "by force if necessary"! Following this absurd sophistry, Mr. Margain introduced an element into the session to which Mr. Worthy, the next speaker, was to attach an enormous and ugly importance. The "white races", he said, must dispose of their "superiority complexes and paternalism" before there can be any meaningful coexistence. "Great and small powers" must confront each other as equals. In other words, the factual reality of international relations must dissolve itself and vanish into the ether of international "equality", lest it otherwise be smitten with the mythical devil-term of racism. Mr. Margain read his speech well; the pity lay in what he said.

Then of course came the inimitable Mr. Worthy, a US news correspondent stationed of late in Prague. Beginning with what seemed at first an intent to be witty, Mr. Worthy let it be known that "Hanoi and the liberation front...have the overwhelming majority of mankind on their side." The United States, he declared, through its bombing of North Vietnam, has left no alternative except a continuation of violent insurrection in the South. Quoting an abolitionist speech of 131 years ago, he declared that "there is not a nation on earth guilty of practices more shocking, more bloody, than are the peoples of the United States at this very hour." Nevertheless, sounding more like a Black Muslim than a newsman, he concluded that "Negro resistance to this war is bound to grow", since "it is not the responsibility of Western White (his emphasis) powers to intervene in the affairs of Vietnam..." "Vietnam is a colonial-racial issue," and in Mr. Worthy's view the United States is to be condemned for what he termed "Uncle Tom's diplomacy". When Professor Scalapino objected during the question period to Mr. Worthy's constant injection of the racial question into the proceedings, the latter promptly replied that liaison between Negro nationalists in the United States and the third world is destined to grow with the result that this will, in his unforgettable words, "change the face of the earth when it comes". As the audience violently applauded this stark threat, the present writer could not help wondering how recent was the speaker's latest perusal of Arthur Rosenberg's "Myth of the Twentieth Century", or how true it is, as the old adage would have it, that if one goes far enough to the left politically one eventually comes face to face with the far Right.

The foregoing are but a few examples of the tone of "debate" which frequently prevailed at the Teach-In. Unfortunately, the morning session on Saturday, which directly preceded the debate on Vietnam, had been little more inspiring. This was the session at which Mr. Jagan, former Premier of British Guiana, called for a political revolution in the United States, and described the Cold War as "largely a myth used to strengthen the hand of the militarists vis-à-vis politicians like me". More devil-terms, more suggestions of imperialist exploitation, etc.; such was the contribution of Mr. Jagan.

Beside Andres Lockward, however, an official delegate of the Social Christian Party of the Dominican Republic, even Mr. Jagan made a brilliant effort to promote international understanding. For when Mr. Lockward was given his turn to address a North American audience, he imparted the unmistakable impression that his speech had been prepared with Dominican conspirators in mind. "Alliance for Progress," he declared, "brings nothing to Latin America. (...) More people die. (...) This is how the Alliance for Progress is being used." The Alliance for Progress brings Sherman Tanks, and the American imperialists continue to kill people as they have been doing for "hundreds of years". In short,



in Mr. Lockward's words, the "Alliance for Progress is a complete failure..." So also, unfortunately, was Mr. Lockward.

Why, in the final analysis, did the Teach-In provide so little in the way of thought, and such a great deal of thoughtless propaganda? Why was this forum which was originally dedicated to enlightened debate converted into a sort of Canadian caricature of Hyde Park? Professor A. Harbury of Ann Arbor summarized the matter quite succinctly: "...Because so many speakers are sticking to their respective governments' positions, the hoped for dialogue has degenerated into first a monologue, and then an ideologue."

So oriented in political mythology, in the never-never land of "imperialists", "exploiters", "aggressors", and "self-determination", where the majority of speakers, that when the occasion presented itself for a descent into the less lofty world of empirical fact they were literally stricken with paralysis and unable to make the transition. How much more secure is the world of mythology, of "capitalists vs. the people", of "the world gendarme vs. the aroused masses" and so on, than the bland world of international power relationships, the problems which the Teach-In was intended to explore. How much less exciting is the latter, how lacking in romance and heroism! And how much easier it is to simply parade the symbols, and observe the ritual of mythology, in short, to conveniently convert oneself into an idiot, than to painstakingly explore the exasperating dilemmas of great power conflict. In the words of Sorel, however, "people who are living in this world of 'myths' are secure from all refutation," and they are required to possess "Intuition alone", rather than "considered analyses".

Moreover, there is no more effective weapon in the arsenal of the demagogue than that which explains the misery of the world's disinherited in terms of the evil designs of anonymous, faceless devils from the opposite extremes of the earth. In truth, the trick is as old as the art of politics itself; there is no more effective way to flatter and win the favor of the oppressed than to blame their oppression and failure not upon such mundane difficulties as insufficient natural resources, deficiencies of the national culture with regard to prerequisites of industrialization, etc., but upon an outsider: as the Chinese would say, "a foreign devil", an unapproachable and distant personification of C. G. Jung's archetype of the shadow. What this deceitful approach betrays all too often on the part of the practitioner, however, is not misty-eyed sentimentalism, or even the pretentious idealism to which its advocates invariably subscribe, but rather in more cases than not a fanatical libido dominandi, an obsessive will to power, on the part of those who do not possess it. It is indicative to remember that it was not Patrick Gordon Walker, Vadim Nekrasov or Zbigniew Brzezinski, but the recently toppled Cheddi Jagan who declared so instructively that "the Cold War is largely a myth used to strengthen the hand of militarists vis-a-vis politicians like me." Moreover, it is always fitting to remember, when one is confronted by a political witch-doctor, the warning of the great humanist Irving Babbitt, when he declared that "homicidal mania is the last stage of sentimentalism".

Nevertheless, if one stands Mr. Jagan's foregoing remark on its head, something emerges from it. For although the Cold War, per se, is most definitely not a myth, mythology has made a signal contribution to its development. It was the Byzantine despot Stalin, educated in a seminary, who was chiefly responsible for bringing to great power competition the novel element of religiosity. And it is Mao Tse-tung, on the one hand, and the chattering adherents of the Fourth International, on the other, who are by and large responsible for sustaining this element at the present time. Under Stalin's successors, however, the "gray flannel suit Communists", the USSR has become a great power. And like it or



not, one of the chief requirements of power, in the nuclear age in particular, is responsibility. Mr. Phuong Margain, the Cambodian representative, can well enough ask the United States, "do you think they (i.e., the Chinese and North Vietnamese) are afraid of your atomic bombs?" But they are the United States and Russia first and foremost who are currently burdened with the responsibility, as the late President Kennedy said, for "staying the hand of mankind's final war". Powerlessness makes possible the luxury of frivolity and glibness; the possession of power makes imperative a sense of prudence and sobriety.

If any comfort is to be drawn from the Teach-In, therefore, it is to be found in the debate of Messrs. Brzezinski and Nekrasov, respectively a professor at Columbia, and chief foreign affairs editor of the Soviet communist party newspaper, Pravda. Mr. Brzezinski brought with him from Columbia a judicious degree of traditional American pragmatism; with Mr. Nekrasov came the temperate ideological formulations of Nikita Khrushchev.

"We are Marxists; we fully accept the interpretations of Lenin," declared Mr. Nekrasov. Those acquainted with the Sino-Soviet rift, however, were not slow to realize that what Mr. Nekrasov was really accepting were the interpretations of Nikita Sergeivich. The chiliastic aspirations of Communist China found short shrift in the Russian delegate's speech. In place of blind faith in so-called "wars of national liberation", he chose to emphasize instead the "balance of forces in the world at large", which have in our time made possible "a peaceful transition to socialism", a transition which will be determined by the presumably inspiring example of the USSR rather than the export of revolution into foreign territory. Moreover, Mr. Nekrasov was determined in his insistence that, following Marx, his government is not interested in "revolution for revolution's sake". The object of the barb was clearly Peking. And echoing Mr. Khrushchev, the Soviet representative made explicit his declaration favoring the "peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems".

Although he interpreted the latter as a continuation of "ideological conflict", and a "competition of ideas", the Soviet delegate showed the usual Russian acrobatic ability in matters of ideology, by declaring in the same speech a tempered support for wars of national liberation. However, for those who have read, "Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma" (Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism), the most comprehensive ideological summary of the post-Stalin era, the general content of Mr. Nekrasov's speech was clear enough. Prudence was its theme and judicious temperance its message. This was unmistakable. Indices of national production have come to have a meaning for the USSR which the Chinese Neanderthals cannot quite understand. Consequently, the Soviets are very much awake to the fact that a major confrontation with the West would spell the destruction of an industrial edifice which is the result of years of sacrifice. In short, they have a vested interest in the status quo, not in the mythology of "infantile leftism" and petty adventurism.

With regard to the less developed countries, however, there was possibly no more sober and instructive voice at the Teach-In than that of Professor Brzezinski. Penetrating directly to the problem of the mythology, as opposed to practical social-economic development, he criticized both the right-wing myth of an "anti-Communist crusade" and the assorted left-wing "Bakunin-ite and Trotskyite" myths associated with the Chinese brand of communism. "A revolution per se," he declared, "is neutral." But what follows can be either anarchistic or constructive.

Pointing to the American revolution and the Russian, Professor Brzezinski was of the opinion that both, with their Nineteenth Century ideological trappings, are currently irrelevant. The United States at the time of its revolution was possessed of a liberal, pluralistic tra-



dition which cannot be expected from the less developed countries. The Russian revolution, in turn, is of little bearing on the third world, since in 1917 Russian industry had already reached what W. W. Rostow calls the period of "take off" and cumulative economic growth.

Regardless of the frivolity with which ideologues might assess the complexities of the third world, therefore, what is of true importance is not the mythology of their revolutions, whether they are "liberal-democratic" or "socialist", but their concrete content, in terms of social and economic development; not whether they are ideologically blessed through being led by a "small, fanatical doctrinaire minority", but whether they are able, hopefully with help from all of the advanced countries, to build schools, roads, factories, ports, and in general raise the level of economic well-being from that of subsistence.




To approach the problem from an alternate angle, Professor Brzezinski declared his conviction that the duty of the great powers is to throw off the blinkers of antiquated mythology which have done so much to divide the world, and to concern themselves once again with the "practical" and the possible. The USSR and its allies on the one hand, the USA and its allies on the other, must seek a common approach to the great problems currently dividing the world, chief among which are those of German reunification, the confirmation of existing European boundaries, and a vigorous program of increased multilateral economic cooperation, particularly with regard to the less developed countries. "Outdated Nineteenth Century ideological positions" may be emotionally gratifying, but they remain nonetheless the primordial poison currently affecting international relations.

If we may summarize briefly, then, the "teachings" of the Teach-In, we must say above all else that it taught that there is no place in the mid-Twentieth Century for Sorelian political mythology--for the mythology of the left or that of the right, and particularly for the Black Muslim mythology of international racism. In immediate terms, the Teach-In solved nothing. Perhaps it was not intended to. What it did do, however, was bring into sharp relief the abyss which divides the voice of reason from that of the ideologue, the voice of prudence from the hysteria of the political witch-doctor. If speakers like Professor Brzezinski, Vadim Nekrasov, Patrick Gordon Walker and a handful of others succeeded in bringing this gap to the level of consciousness in the minds of their listeners, then theirs was a great contribution indeed. Viewed in this light, even Messrs. Jagan, Worthy, Lockward, Margain and several others made a perverse contribution in their own limited way. For they showed that while the world at present may be lacking in many respects, it is not lacking in hysterics. And while the powerless ideologues may be able to afford the luxury of mythological ritual, the spokesmen of nations cannot--nor indeed can the less developed countries, in whose name and for whose sake the ritualists pretend to speak.

#### --Publicola



"The biggest drawback of all is that the Alliance has become the exclusive domain of economists and technicians, while the politicians carry on hard-nosed and shortsighted diplomacy, including even armed intervention. The result is that the Alliance is losing the people. To get them back, it needs to become once again the political program which it was at the outset. This means that whatever we do or contemplate doing in Latin America--whether it is in Santo Domingo, Panama, Brazil or anywhere else--ought to be considered from the point of view of what it does to or for the Alliance. This program will never succeed as just a fund for buying off revolution..." --Robert Goldmann, in the New Republic, October 30, 1965.





BY TED PAULS

# *the sounds of winter*



By sounds is winter's presence known--  
not digits on a dated pad--  
Heard soon after the birds have flown  
recalling things cheerful and sad.  
The harsh and jagged morning sound  
of reluctant motors starting;  
The futile whine as wheels go 'round  
lacking traction for departing.  
Snow-tires growl and snow-chains clatter  
on the cold and barren asphalt lane;  
Chill winds blow and dead leaves scatter--  
or rustle as in quiet pain.  
The crunch of snow beneath your shoes  
and new boots softly squeaking  
Help drive away the winter blues  
brought on by dead limbs creaking.  
Stomping feet and cheerful cries  
announce visitors at the door;  
But howling wind that moans and sighs  
recalls the sobbing of the poor.  
Hear the mournful scrape of shovels  
over concrete pavement stones,  
And the snow-laden roofs of hovels  
beneath the weight emitting groans.  
Yes, these the sounds of winter's reign  
the childhood memories recall--  
Sounds of joy and sounds of pain  
familiar, somehow, to all.



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About twenty years ago, a new era of mankind dawned: the United States dropped atomic bombs on two Japanese cities. That this action, destructive as it proved to be, was both necessary and desirable is an opinion held by the overwhelming majority of the American people. With the help of twenty years of perspective, Gar Alperovitz and others have recently been doing some rethinking on the topic.

The biggest myth that needs to be exploded is that atomic bombs were dropped out of military necessity. The common contention is that the fanatical Japanese were willing to fight until their homeland was occupied and their army annihilated. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is argued, were the only alternative to launching an immensely costly invasion of the Japanese islands themselves.

First of all, it should be noted that the Japanese government sent out feelers for peace talks early in 1945. Japan was not willing to surrender unconditionally at that time, but any rational man realized that the military demise of the empire was close at hand. The US, bent upon unconditional surrender, did not explore the possibility that the war could be ended early. The conditions that Japan demanded as part of a settlement were very basic ones: that the emperor would receive guarantees and that the homeland would not be occupied by American troops. Whether a reasonable settlement could have been negotiated in early 1945 is a moot point; the real point is that the Japanese saw their eventual doom coming and wished to avoid it.

The contemplated invasion of the Japanese home islands was scheduled for November, 1945. After V-E day, it was evident that Russia was going to invade Manchuria during the summer. The Red Army would have eventually entered Korea and Northern China. Many people thought that Japan would capitulate unconditionally after the Russian steamroller got going. But before Soviet troops could do much the bombs were dropped.

Many people also suggested that the US give a demonstration of the bomb to the Japanese on an uninhabited island. Seemingly this was rejected because the bomb, having no actual battle history, might fail to explode.

Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall all expressed the opinion in 1945 that A-bombing was not necessary to win the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that Japan would surrender unconditionally without use of the bomb or invasion. The US Strategic Bombing Survey, when reviewing the effects of American bombing after the war, came to the conclusion that "Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if the Russians had not entered not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

Hence we see that there were actually three

dissenting  
opinions



very tangible possibilities of ending the war without usage of the atomic bomb: negotiated settlement, entrance of Russia into the war and demonstration of the nuclear device. The Strategic Bombing Survey also feels that the general course of the conflict, being disastrous to Japan, would eventually have caused our adversary to surrender unconditionally.

Possibly none of these alternatives would have panned out. That the US, however, did not give one of them a chance is enough to indicate that the bomb was not dropped out of military necessity.

There is one final objection to this argument. Perhaps Truman was not aware that these other alternatives existed. Evidence is, though, that the President was very much aware, and tried to twist the alternatives to suit American purposes. (I might add that one should not place the blame solely on President Truman--his civilian advisors, like Stimson and Byrnes, were very much in favor of using the bomb.)

The question now becomes: why was the bomb dropped? The answer seems to lie in the area of political considerations. The US wanted more political leverage in the peace talks after the war so that the Western conception of how things should be ordered would prevail. The war had to be ended fast in the Pacific, or else Soviet troops would occupy Manchuria and other areas and hence spread Russian influence. The bomb had to be used in combat demonstration, so as to show that the US had a bite to match its bark. In fact, that the bomb would be used was an unchallenged assumption underlying all of the diplomatic planning during that part of the Truman Administration.

Analogous scheming occurred in Stalin's mind in 1944. By summer of that year, the Soviet army in every way outclassed the Nazi machine. The Germans had at that time been thrown out of Russia proper, and the Red units were perched on the plains of Poland--the going relatively easy to Berlin. Instead of ending the war in autumn of 1944, as could easily have been done had the Russians set out for Berlin, Stalin decided to abandon military considerations and make political ones paramount. He decided that it would be of great advantage during the post-war talks to have the Red Army in the Balkans, and hence the Russians procrastinated lengthily before taking Warsaw while the main thrust of the Soviet drive was turned southward.

The case of Shimoda and others vs. Japan is interesting. The District Court of Tokyo was considering this about a year ago. Five victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki sued the US for damages sustained--various grisly deformities and tumors. The Japanese government waived American responsibility and took on the charges. On Pearl Harbor Day of 1964, the court--noted for the impartiality by which it treated the case--handed down a decision in favor of the bomb victims. The court concluded that the A-bombing created massive and indiscriminate destruction and suffering. This violated a basic principle of international law which states that civilians and civilian property must be left alone as much as possible during wartime.

The thing that bothers me about the use of atomic bombs by the US is that it established a precedent, and created an aura of legitimacy about the whole concept. Nuclear bombing today is considered a legitimate, if drastic, step to take in a war. Senator Goldwater and others advocate the use of A-bombs to "defoliate" the jungle areas of South Vietnam. Yet no one seems to suggest that the US poison gas the Viet Cong out of existence, despite the relevance of that tactic in jungle warfare. The use of poison gas or biological warfare is considered illegitimate. And yet there is no basic moral difference between using any of the three forms of mass destruction. If anything, gas attack should be considered more desirable than nuclear attack, for the former selectively destroys only human beings, leaving the trees, rivers and



buildings alone. And gas disseminates into harmlessness, whereas radio-activity plagues humanity for countless generations to come. Moreover, building a gas delivery capability is far less expensive than constructing a nuclear one. The essential difference in 1945 was that while retaliation by the Japanese against A-bombing was impossible, retaliation by gas or plague would not have been so difficult. Now, however, as the nuclear capability spreads, this distinction doesn't exist.

The use of the A-bomb by the US turned the arms race into nuclear channels. It is conceivable that had nuclear weapons never been exposed to the world at large, their status today might be the illegitimate one held by gas and artificial plague.

While I feel that the use of A-bombs in World War II was unfortunate and undesirable, I can conceive of situations wherein such a tactic would have been justified. E.g., had Nazi Germany overrun North Africa, the Middle East and Russia east of the Urals--as Hitler had planned--in short, had the Nazis won the conventional war, then I would have advocated a systematic destruction of German cities by atomic bomb until the Germans capitulated. Which just goes to show that the use of a weapon, no matter how terrible, in order that Good may triumph over Evil, is morally acceptable. And since each side considers itself Good and the other Evil (usually both are wrong), the armaments race is on a permanent escalator.

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"Besides the inherent technical difficulties of wilderness conservation, the effort to save original nature faces a whole constellation of other kinds of problems. The easiest obstacle to recognize is the opposition by people who oppose the keeping of wilderness for material reasons. These people would shape the world into an ant hill; they are clearly mad. It is unthinkable that they will much longer control the destiny of the race. There is another block of humanity that simply does not care; and an unsorted lot who think of themselves as conservationists, and who in one way or another are, but who are not facing the really tough obligation at all. I refer to all people who think of saving nature for meat, timber or picnic grounds for the future; and to the hunters who hope their grandsons will get red blood by shooting things, and to the reverence-for-life cultists who are foredoomed to inconsistency, and to the biologists who resist the loss of material for study, and to keepers of zoological gardens who preserve nature in cages. Putting this mixture of motives and aspirations together under the label conservation has made, in some cases, a temporarily stronger front. But it has muddled the real issue, hidden the dimensions of the long job and kept everybody from articulating the awful certainty that the hard saving has got to be done for the sake of abstract values." --Archie Carr, in "The Reptiles".  
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You are unduly perturbed by the proposals for a constitutional convention, which you say would have "no apparent limit upon its authority to alter the Constitution". Such a convention's authority is very far from unlimited, since it cannot alter the Constitution at all, but can only propose alterations. Read Article V again. It is quite clear that any amendment proposed by the convention must be ratified by three-fourths of the states, exactly the same as for amendments proposed by Congress. By the way, your discussion of ways to thwart such a scheme by means of loopholes and technicalities seems rather difficult to square with your frequent strictures upon me for my supposed lack of respect for democratic government in other countries. ({Why is my dis-



cussion of loopholes and technicalities which might be utilized to prevent the convening of a constitutional convention "difficult to square" with my chiding of you for a failure to respect democracy? I do not necessarily advocate all of the things that I discuss. My article dealt with the response of government officials and individual citizens to attempts to radically revise the Constitution; I concluded that the government officials, both liberals and conservatives, would utilize every conceivable loophole to avoid this, and would be overwhelmingly supported by the people. Concerning one of the loopholes mentioned, I offered the opinion that, as a last resort, it would constitute the lesser of two evils, but other than that I did nothing more than report of what would probably take place, neither advocating nor opposing any of the courses noted. Even had I enthusiastically advocated utilizing loopholes and misinterpreted technicalities to thwart the effort to convene such a convention, however, this would not constitute a commentary on my eligibility to accuse anyone else of lacking respect for democracy. The simple fact is, it isn't democracy but rather the domination of rural legislators which would be thwarted. There is no substantial popular demand for reversing the reapportionment decisions; the proposal for a convention was sponsored by malapportioned state legislatures for the purpose of protecting their unfair apportionment. In essence, minority-dominated legislatures voted to preserve the minority domination of legislatures; democracy was lost in the shuffle. If the issue were democracy (if, i.e., a popular referendum on legislative apportionment were proposed), I would oppose utilizing dubious technicalities and loopholes to prevent its being held.))

As to the substance of the proposed amendments, I am quite in favor of permitting the states to have the upper houses of their legislatures apportioned on a basis other than population. However, I suspect that a constitutional amendment would not have much effect, since the Supreme Court could be expected to misinterpret it just as shamelessly as they misconstrued the Constitution to produce the reapportionment decision in the first place.

To me, the basic issue here is not whether any particular type of apportionment is good or bad; the question is whether the Supreme Court (or anyone else) has the right to revise the Constitution except by formal amendment. For there is not the slightest doubt that the Founding Fathers approved of the geographically-apportioned state senate. Such arrangements antedated the Constitution; in very fact, the Senate-and-House plan for the Federal Government was based on the colonial legislatures--in particular, Connecticut--with which the Founders were familiar. Thus, there cannot be any serious claim that the Founders intended one man/one vote to prevail in both houses of the states. The reapportionment decision can only be defended on the ground that it is right for the Court to revise the Constitution in the light of present wisdom--and of course that is in opposition to the whole idea of the rule of law. (Not "present wisdom" but rather the transition from a predominantly rural to predominantly urban society necessitated revising the composition of state legislatures. Ideally, this should have been accomplished by constitutional amendment, but in this particular case that was impossible: obviously, the elements in control of legislatures aren't going to ratify a constitutional amendment depriving them of that control.))

I note in passing that Section 4 of Article IV charges the Federal Government to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." In 1787 the distinction between "republican" and "democratic" forms of government was clearly drawn. "Republican" very definitely included geographical apportionment and similar devices intended precisely to thwart the possibility of "democratic", i.e., mob,



rule. Perhaps these devices are superfluous or even harmful; if so, the way to get rid of them is to amend the Constitution in the prescribed manner, not just to deliberately and cynically misinterpret it.

You define "true conservatives" as "those individuals inclined by temperament to conserve the status quo, as distinguished from reactionaries of the Goldwater ilk who have appropriated the term 'conservative'." We reactionaries did not "appropriate" the term; we acquired it quite naturally. When the New Deal began in 1933 to bring forth its radical legislation, those who opposed it were very properly called "conservative", since they wanted to preserve the status quo of that time. The "conservatives" of today are the direct intellectual descendants of those anti-New Dealers, and the term "conservative" stuck to us even though the New Deal has become the new status quo which we desire to change. The beliefs which characterize modern "conservatives"--balanced budgets, limited government, free market, hard anti-communism, etc.--are precisely the beliefs which were the "conventional wisdom" at the time we acquired the label of "conservative". I quite agree that the term is no longer appropriate, but after all it is no more anomalous than it is to call "liberal" those who believe in expanded and centralized government.

You inform me that "There are no 'rules' of the market economy, in the sense of moral or rational dicta which must be 'enforced'; there are only laws, similar to the laws of the physical sciences--i.e., statements of what does in fact occur, and why." I must say that this is true only because you apparently define it to be true; i.e., you implicitly define a "market economy" as one in which no moral or rational dicta are enforced. Ipse dixit. It is of course your privilege to use any definitions you please, but kindly bear in mind that I, and all the free-market economists whom I have studied, carefully specify that there are rules of conduct which must be observed in a market economy, precisely to keep the market free.

However, I am glad that you understand that there are indeed laws of economics, comparable to the laws of physics. All too many liberals suffer from the delusion that economics is a purely cultural study; that is, that our economy works as it does merely because everybody agrees to act in certain ways, and that practically any change could be made simply by changing the agreement.

Of course I disagree profoundly with your conception of just what the laws of economics are. I have yet to see any evidence to support your thesis that "monopoly is the inevitable outcome of unrestricted competition" (my emphasis). Granted that such may occasionally happen under certain rare circumstances, nevertheless unrestricted competition is in general the best cure for monopolies. Yes, I know the theory that a large and wealthy outfit can undersell its competitors, at a loss, until they go out of business, and then jack up prices to an unconscionable level. The trouble with this simplistic theory is that it neglects to ask, what happens then? Why, as soon as the price is put up, it becomes profitable for new competition to appear. If you study the industrial history of the so-called "robber baron" era, you find again and again that monopolies maintained themselves not by cut-throat competition, but by getting government aid in preserving their monopoly. See, for instance, the Credit Mobilier affair. And as I recall, when Leland Stanford was sewing up California for the Southern Pacific, he found it expedient to buy a sizable part of the California legislature. This is not my idea of a free market. (Of course, I do not deny that monopolists will avail themselves of government influence, professional arsonists or any other non-economic means of eliminating competition, but I contend that the basic fault resides with the ethic of the market itself, which enshrines profit as the overriding consideration of every



action. You are grossly overestimating the possibility of genuine competition in today's market. The capital required to construct facilities capable of competing with the huge steel producers, automobile manufacturers or oil refineries is virtually prohibitive; and once the capital has been secured and operations begun, the independent producer then faces the prospect of being undersold until he is bankrupt. Given sufficient wealth and determination, it is possible for such competition to occur, but in practice it is not very probable. Anyway, given the ethic of the market, such competition is likely to eventually result in a price-fixing agreement, mutually profitable to the industrialists at the expense of the consumers. Even in the consumer field, companies are so huge and wealthy that independent producers are unable to compete and must settle for such local markets as the big producers permit them or go out of business. How does an independent capitalist go about competing with a corporation like Lever Brothers or Standard Brands that spends millions of dollars annually just on advertising?)

The second "law" which you enunciate is simply preposterous: "Another 'law' of the market economy concerns the elimination of surplus labor by driving X number of workers--those who comprise the surplus--out of the market (and, usually, into starvation)." You don't define surplus labor, so I shall assume that you do not mean those who are unemployable because of their own characteristics, like the insane or the grossly crippled, but rather some quantity of able workers who are in excess of what the economy needs at the moment. If that is what you mean, it is ridiculous. In a market economy, wages are (by definition) free to move in response to supply and demand. If the supply of labor should become greater than the demand, then wages will fall. As the price of labor goes down, the demand increases, and a new wage level is set where the two curves intersect--the level at which everyone who wants a job can get one. I suspect that you are a victim of the fallacy that the demand for labor is inelastic, so that at any given time only a certain number of workers are needed to do the available work, and any excess over this number will be unemployed. This is not so; the work to be done is unlimited. A good example confronts me at the moment. I want my apartment redecorated. The landlord will probably do it, but assuming that he won't, then I must hire it done, do it myself, or leave it undone. If the going wage is, say, \$3/hour, I couldn't afford it. But if, because there are "surplus" workers, someone offers to do it for \$1.50/hour, then I would hire him, creating a job where there had been none. There are millions of such marginal jobs--things which people will hire done if they can get workers cheaply, but which otherwise will be done by themselves, or even not done at all. The tendency of the free market is to cause supply and demand to meet, in labor as in other commodities. When there is more than marginal unemployment, you may be sure that something--such as union monopoly or a minimum wage law--is interfering with market freedom. (Ignoring the fact that redecorating your apartment might require skills not possessed by many unemployed steel-workers or coal-miners, let us strike directly at the heart of the matter: What if the "surplus" laborer compelled by the market to work for \$1.50/hour at the marginal job you have provided for him cannot feed or clothe his children on that wage?)

The President's recent successes in unofficial price control should have some interesting effects. When prices are held below the market level (and the market level in this case has risen because of the Government's inflationary deficits), the demand will increase and the supply decrease. Result: shortage. Other things being equal, we may expect shortages of aluminum and copper to appear in the next few months (after the Government stockpiles are sold off). This will be seized upon as a demonstration of the failure of the market economy, and proof



of the need for more government controls. (I should think you'd approve of President Johnson's method of preventing the price increases. Instead of using the "government" method of threatening to toss the company executives into jail, he utilized the "free enterprise" method of threatening to glut the market...)

You are quite correct to point out that I should have excluded Yugoslavia when I said that it was a foregone conclusion that Communist governments would be hostile to us. In extenuation, I plead that I had in mind the formation of new Communist governments, such as we may expect momentarily in the Dominican Republic. But I should have been more careful in my statement. However, I do not concede that Tito is not our enemy; only that his enmity is not active enough to justify military intervention. If it came to war in Europe, I have very little doubt which side Tito would be on. (As long as we are noting exceptions (even if only the ground that their enmity is not active enough to justify military intervention), what about Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria?)

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"Pressures, either crude or sophisticated, to obtain conformity do not produce either virtue or freedom. Thus, for example, the practice so prevalent in many parishes of forcing children to go to Mass every day or to confession every Thursday before First Friday are intolerable abuses of human freedom and a poor substitute for development of conviction and virtue. But such practices enable pastors to feel they are developing 'good habits' in children. It is astonishing that generations of experience with the disappearance of these good habits have not persuaded anyone of the utter folly of virtue by compulsion."  
--Fr. Andrew Greeley, in America, November 13, 1965.  
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The poor showing of the Republican Party in the presidential election of 1964 was no fluke. Nor was it the fault of some ripping flaw in the philosophy of the party itself. The defeat was due to a long and fantastic list of extra-political circumstances. All but one of these circumstances pointed to the election of Johnson--as a Democratic victory rather than a Republican defeat--and only one of these circumstances could and should have been averted.

The circumstances include: (1) The fact that Johnson had been in the White House for only a year, not long enough to do much apparent damage. The people do not like to switch to a new president every year; they are much too conservative for that. So LBJ is retained. (2) The manner in which LBJ entered the White House, which, paradoxically, lent cohesiveness to the country. (3) The election of the left-leaning Labour Party in Britain, which consciously and sub-consciously impressed on the minds of many US citizens the knowledge that somewhere a liberal had been elected and a conservative defeated. (4) The lack of any big issues with the Administration. If a campaign has to attach importance to an item of such lack of magnitude as the Bobby Baker case, one might as well forget the whole thing. (5) The ousting of Nikita Khrushchev shortly before our election. (6) Some type of incident near Vietnam (I cannot remember the details) which had people's nerves on edge for a couple of days. This happened very shortly before the election. These six events put the American people in a frame of mind that was not conducive to a presidential change. Accordingly, no change was made; and by all laws of logic, no incompetency label should have been attached to the losing party. But elections are political contests rather than tests of logic, so the Republicans looked bad for losing heavily, even



though the political climate heavily favored retention of the incumbents. (Post-election analyses invariably reveal a plethora of factors bearing on the outcome; virtually everything that happens during a political campaign has some effect on the outcome of the election, and in a close race these incidental occurrences may be decisive. In 1960, for example, it is quite conceivable that Richard Nixon would have been elected except for the fact that a recession reached its worst point just weeks prior to the election. But when the election results are so lop-sided as to constitute a catastrophe for the losing party, one must seek the causes elsewhere than in comparatively unimportant events such as the election of a left-leaning Prime Minister in Great Britain, the ouster of a Soviet Premier and (to name one you overlooked) the explosion of a nuclear device by a clique of bellicose revolutionaries. Perhaps you would care to explain the Republican loss of the Iowa legislature in terms of "a political climate heavily (favoring) retention of the incumbent(s)"...?)

The final circumstance contributing to the Johnson landslide was lack of solidarity in the Republican camp. This is the one circumstance that can be rated as a negative for the Republicans rather than a positive for the Democrats. It includes the attacks on Goldwater by the liberal wing of the party, including all the talk about "mainstream" of Republican thought. It includes the infamous letter sent to Goldwater by Scranton, urging him to vote for the Civil Rights Bill. Inner dissension coupled with capable opposition led to the victory for Johnson. However, none of the above-mentioned circumstances seem to add up to your contention that the party needs to change its whole philosophy.

If the party decides to have a wholesale purge, I suggest it repudiate the liberal wing, who are not Republicans at all. They might begin by reading out John Lindsay, who most likely would like nothing better. (If your intention is to prohibit the recovery of the GOP, then this is an extremely sensible suggestion; however, I suspect that most of the professional politicians in the Republican Party will eventually come to the more reasonable conclusion that it is the losers (such as Buckley and Storey) rather than the winners (Lindsay and Specter) who must be disavowed.)

You describe Buckley as "an immensely more attractive" candidate than Goldwater, noting that the former received but 350,000 votes in New York City as opposed to the latter's 800,000. The meagerness of the Buckley showing can be simply explained: No one, including Buckley, expected that the Conservative Party would win the New York mayoralty race. Buckley's purpose in entering the race was not victory, as was Goldwater's. Therefore the motivation to vote for him was not strong. (No one, including the candidate, expected Henry Cabot Lodge to win the 1964 Republican primary in New Hampshire; nevertheless, he did, and as a write-in candidate (indicating that his supporters were strongly enough motivated to go to some extra trouble to vote for him). Another factor which ought to be considered is that an "extremist" candidate (ultra-conservative or socialist) is likely to get more votes when everybody realizes he can't win, because people who wouldn't actually want to see him elected cast votes for him as a protest. Remember that Governor Wallace very nearly won the Maryland presidential primary in May, 1964; yet there was no significant "backlash" in the November election, when the question was actually who would occupy the White House. In my opinion, the reason Buckley received so few votes was, simply and logically, that few people agreed with his position.)

The election of Lindsay, whatever else it might be, can hardly be construed as a Republican victory; for the man has gone to great lengths to disassociate himself from the Republican name. (I am glad you agree that Mayor Lindsay's victory was not a Republican victory; it



was, first, an individual victory and, second, a liberal victory.))

I'm uncertain how seriously the "New Left" should be taken. Their approach is rather unusual in that they are unorganized--not connected with a political party, pressure group or political machine. They have bypassed all the traditional political devices, and have appealed directly to public opinion. The results of their best efforts, I believe, will be solely negativistic--propaganda for the Communists, and a general loss of dignity and morale for this country. The "New Left" (and the fact that I put it in quotes is some indication of how seriously I take it) will exert no positive influence on policies for the simple reason that it lacks organization and money. These two necessities it will never get. It will never get organization because, usually, one can only be a New Leftist as long as one is of the age that one can pretend to be some sort of college student. Retirement age would be about 27, at which age the father closes the purse-strings and says, "That's all you're getting from me!" and the poor beggar has to go out and get a job. He then has the money, but at the same time has been thrust into the midst of the capitalist world. So who needs to be a New Leftist then? (It is manifestly absurd to assert that the New Left will exert no positive influence on policies, when in fact it has already done so (in the area of civil rights). As for an inability to influence policy in the future due to a lack of organization and money, I would not advise you to count on it. Organization and adequate financing are the requirements for success for any conventional political movement, lobby or pressure group. The New Left, however, by operating outside the context of normal political activity, greatly reduces the importance of these requirements. Loose, local, non-hierarchical organization is quite sufficient for the activities of most of the New Left groups, especially SDS, which functions as a catalyst for more conventionally structured organizations and ad hoc committees concerned with specific grievances. Financing is no particular problem, either, for the workers are largely volunteers, facilities (from freedom schools in the South to SDS "offices" in northern slums) are either donated or inexpensively rented, and the New Left does not require buttons, billboards, television and radio "spots", newspaper ads and the other publicity devices which are the major expense of all conventional political movements.))

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